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Abstract
This paper examines the logical relationship between distributive equity and
eﬃciency in aggregating inﬁnite utility streams. Our main results show that
there exist social welfare functions which satisfy the axioms of Pigou-Dalton
Transfer Principle and a weak version of eﬃciency, but there exists no social
welfare function which satisﬁes all of the distributive equity requirements and
Weak Pareto Principle at the same time. Thus, we can prove that no Paretian
Department of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, 2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo, Japan, 186-
8601. E-mail: b111126u@r.hit-u.ac.jp; Tel: +81-42-580-8192; Fax: +81-42-580-8195. This paper is
part of my Ph. D. thesis at Hitotsubashi University. The main results of this paper (Propositions
3-4 and Corollaries 1-2) overlap with Alcantud (2010), Alcantud (2011), and Alcantud and Garcia-
Sanz (2010). These works independently proved the propositions around the same time. I would
like to thank Kotaro Suzumura, Motohiro Sato, Peter Lambert, Kiwako Sakamoto, Reiko Gotoh
and Toyotaka Sakai for helpful comments and suggestions. I am also grateful to the anonymous
referees whose helpful comments contributed to the improvement of this paper. Financial support
from the 21st century Centers of Excellence (COE) project on “Normative Evaluation and Social
Choice of Contemporary Economic Systems” is gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining errors are
my responsibility.ranking can satisfy the numerical representability and all of the distributive
equity properties in the setting of intertemporal social choice.
1 Introduction
This paper examines the logical relationship between intergenerational equity and ef-
ﬁciency in terms of the existence of a social welfare function. In analyzing the in-
tertemporal social choice problem, two classes of equity axioms have considered in
the previous literature. The ﬁrst one is a class of anonymity axioms that demands
each generation to be treated equally in the evaluation of inﬁnite utility streams (Di-
amond 1965; Svensson 1980; Campbell 1985; Epstein 1986; Lauwers 1997; Shinotsuka
1998; Basu and Mitra 2003; 2007b; Mitra and Basu 2007). The second one is a class
of distributive equity properties that prefers a more equitable distribution of utilities
(Fleurbaey and Michel 2001; 2003; Sakai 2003; 2006; Asheim and Tungodden 2004;
Bossert, et al. 2007; Hara, et al. 2007).
Basu and Mitra’s pioneering study reveals some impossibility/possibility results
between Finite Anonymity requirement and variations of Pareto eﬃciency (Basu and
Mitra 2007b). In this paper, we will focus on the distributive equity properties and
analyze the compatibility of these properties with eﬃciency requirements. One of
the most fundamental equity properties is Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle adapted to
the inﬁnite-horizon framework. Our main results show that there exist social welfare
functions which satisfy Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle and a weak version of eﬃciency
(called Weak Dominance in the previous literature), but there exists no social welfare
function which satisﬁes all of the distributive equity requirements and Weak Pareto
2Principle at the same time. Thus, we can prove impossibility results that show no
Paretian social welfare function can satisfy all of the distributive equity properties.
These impossibility results form a contrast to a social ranking approach in which many
possibility results can be gained by sacriﬁcing the continuity requirement (Basu and
Mitra 2007a; Bossert, Sprumont, and Suzumura 2007).
2 Basic Notations and Denitions
Let R denote the set of real numbers. Let Z+, Z++ stand, respectively, for the set
of non-negative and positive integers. We also denote the set of all possible utility
levels for each generation by Y , so the set of inﬁnite utility streams is X = Y Z++. For
simplicity of notation, we denote the K times repetition of the ﬁnite vector (x1,...,xT)
by (x1,...,xT)K-rep, where T,K ∈ Z++. If K = ∞, then we write (x1,...,xT)K-rep as
(x1,...,xT)rep. Throughout this paper, we interpret the utilities as either income levels
or level-plus comparable ones following Blackorby et al. (1984).
There are at least two ways to evaluate inﬁnite utility streams deﬁned as above.
One way is to use a primitive binary relation on X, and the other way is to consider a
social welfare function, i.e., a real-valued function deﬁned on X. Here we use the latter
approach and examine the possibility/impossibility results of social welfare functions
satisfying some appealing properties.
As Basu and Mitra (2003; 2007b) show, Finite Anonymity contradicts Pareto princi-
ple in the context of social welfare function approach. The anonymity axiom, however,
treats each generation equally in their utility levels and ignores a distributional aspect
of utility levels.
3Hence our paper focuses on some concepts of distributional equity which are pro-
posed by the previous studies (Fleurbaey and Michel 2001; 2003; Sakai 2003; 2006;
Asheim and Tungodden 2004; Hara, et al. 2007) as a solution to the problem concern-
ing the aggregating inﬁnite utility streams.
First, we introduce Strict Equity Preference axiom which is used by the axiomatic
characterization of leximin rankings in Bossert, et al. (2007).
Strict Equity Preference (SPE): ∀x,y ∈ X,∀i,j ∈ Z++;
[yi > xi ≥ xj > yj & ∀k ̸= i,j,xk = yk] ⇒ W(x) > W(y).
In this axiom, social welfare is improved whenever a income transfer from the
better-oﬀ generation to the worse-oﬀ one is exercised, which may increase or decrease
total surplus between the loss of the rich and the gain of the poor.
This axiom can be divided into the following three variations of equity requirements
according to the degree of inequality aversion over an income transfer.
The ﬁrst axiom is the well-known condition called Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle,
which is a standard axiom in the study of income inequality measures.
Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle (PDT): ∀x,y ∈ X,∀ϵ > 0,∀i,j ∈ Z++;
[xi = yi − ϵ ≥ yj + ϵ = xj & ∀k ̸= i,j,xk = yk] ⇒ W(x) > W(y).
Intuitively, this axiom says that transferring income from the rich to the poor is
always good as long as the relative position between them will not be reversed.
The deﬁnitions of the following two variations of SEP depend on diﬀerences between
4the welfare loss of the rich and the welfare gain of the poor.
Altruistic Equity-1 (AE-1): ∀x,y ∈ X,∀ϵ > δ > 0,∀i,j ∈ Z++;
[xi = yi − δ ≥ yj + ϵ = xj & ∀k ̸= i,j,xk = yk] ⇒ W(x) > W(y).
Altruistic Equity-2 (AE-2): ∀x,y ∈ X,∀ϵ > δ > 0,∀i,j ∈ Z++;
[xi = yi − ϵ ≥ yj + δ = xj & ∀k ̸= i,j,xk = yk] ⇒ W(x) > W(y).
Altruistic Equity-1, the axiom proposed by Hara, et al. (2007), states that a transfer
from the rich to the poor should be done if the utility gain of the poor is greater than
the utility loss of the rich through this transfer.
On the contrary, Altruistic Equity-2 requires that society should accept a transfer
from the rich to the poor even if the utility gain of the poor is smaller than the utility
loss of the rich.
The last of the equity axioms we use is the one investigated by Asheim, Mitra and
Tungodden (2007) and Banerjee (2006).
Hammond Equity for Future Generations (HEF): ∀x,y ∈ X;
[y1 > x1 > ¯ x > ¯ y & ∀i ≥ 2,xi = ¯ x & yi = ¯ y] ⇒ W(x) > W(y).
This axiom states that social welfare must increase if inequity between generation
1 and all future generations is wholly improved. Note that this axiom is logically
independent of Strict Equity Preference.
5Now, we continue by introducing the eﬃciency requirement in the framework of
social welfare function. The ﬁrst axiom is the standard Pareto criterion.
Pareto Principle (P): ∀x,y ∈ X;
[∀i ∈ Z++, xi ≥ yi & ∃j ∈ Z++ xj > yj] ⇒ W(x) > W(y).
In the previous studies, this eﬃciency condition is often shown to be too strong to
gain the possibility results. Therefore, this paper considers two weak forms of Pareto
Principle as in Basu and Mitra (2007b). The ﬁrst version can be written as follows;
Weak Pareto Principle (WP): ∀x,y ∈ X; ∀i ∈ Z++,xi > yi ⇒ W(x) > W(y).
Weak Pareto Principle requires that social welfare must be improved whenever all
generations strictly increase their utilities. The second condition of eﬃciency is deﬁned
as follows;
Weak Dominance (WD): ∀x,y ∈ X;
[∃j ∈ Z++, xj > yj & ∀i ̸= j, xi = yi] ⇒ W(x) > W(y).
Weak Dominance axiom states that an improvement of exactly one generation’s
utility increases social welfare. Under Weak Dominance, we can easily show that AE-2
implies PDT and PDT implies AE-11.
1Note that the logical relationships among three equity axioms are all independent under Weak
Pareto Principle.
63 Consistency of the Dominance Principle
This section examines the logical compatibility between Weak Dominance –one of the
Pareto requirements– and three variations of SEP.
First, we show an impossibility result for AE-2 which is the strongest requirement
among our three axioms.
Proposition 1: Let the range of utility function Y include a closed interval [0,1].
Then, there exists no social welfare function satisfying AE-2 and WD.
[Proof] Suppose to the contrary. Let a social choice function W satisfy AE-2 and
WD. Deﬁne the two utility streams x(ϵ),y(ϵ) as follows;
For ϵ ∈ (3/10,1/2),
x(ϵ) =
(
2ϵ,
1
2
ϵ, (δ)rep
)
,
y(ϵ) =
(
ϵ,
1
2
ϵ, (δ)rep
)
,
where δ ∈ [0,1]. It is easy to show that both x(ϵ) and y(ϵ) are in (0,1)Z++ for any
ϵ. Now, for each ϵ ∈ (3/10,1/2), the condition WD implies W(x(ϵ)) > W(y(ϵ)).
Then, for each ϵ,ϵ′ ∈ (3/10,1/2), ϵ > ϵ′ implies 2ϵ′ > ϵ > ϵ/2 > ϵ′/2 and 2ϵ′ − ϵ >
1
2
(ϵ − ϵ′). Hence, we have W(y(ϵ)) > W(x(ϵ′)) because of AE-2. By the above
argument, W(x(ϵ′)) > W(y(ϵ′)) holds. Therefore, for any ϵ,ϵ′ ∈ (3/10,1/2) with
ϵ > ϵ′, both of the two closed intervals [W(y(ϵ)),W(x(ϵ))] and [W(y(ϵ′)),W(x(ϵ′))]
are non-degenerate and the intersection of them must be empty. Thus, for any real
number ϵ ∈ (3/10,1/2), we can choose a distinct rational number r(ϵ) from the closed
interval [W(y(ϵ)),W(x(ϵ))]. This implies, however, that the cardinality of continuum
is a countable cardinality: a contradiction. ∥
7Since the axiom SEP implies AE-2, the following corollary can be immediately
established by the above proposition.
Corollary 12: Let Y ⊇ [0,1]. Then, there is no social welfare function satisfying
SEP and WD.
Hammond Equity for Future Generations is logically independent of Altruistic
Equity-2, but Banerjee (2006) proves that this equity requirement contradicts Weak
Dominance.
Proposition 2 (Banerjee 2006): Let Y ⊇ [0,1]. Then, there is no social welfare
function satisfying HEF and WD.
By replacing WD by WP, we can, however, immediately obtain a possibility result
for HEF. For example, W(x) = min{x1,x2} is a social welfare function satisfying both
HEF and WP (Asheim, Mitra and Tungodden 2007, Example 1). But this function is
not particularly useful because it does not impose value on procedural and distributive
equity. The condition HEF, in this sense, is so weak as a concept of distributive equity
that a class of social welfare functions satisfying this axiom is not desirable.
The next proposition says that Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle can be consistent
with Weak Dominance3.
Proposition 3: There exist social welfare functions satisfying PDT and WD.
2Under Weak Dominance, the axiom SEP is equivalent to the requirement of Hammond Equity
(Alcantud 2011, Lemma 1). Hence, this corollary means that there is no SWF satisfying the conditions
of Weak Dominance and Hammond Equity.
3Weak Dominance is a kind of weakened eﬃciency conditions. However, there is another way to
relax Pareto Principle. For example, Monotonicity is a weaker version of Pareto Principle, which
requires that weakly improvement of all generations’ utilities never decreases social welfare. But
the proofs of propositions 4-6 in the next section show the non-existence of social welfare functions
satisfying Monotonicity and our three axioms of distributive equity.
8[Proof] The following functions are a variation of SWFs which are proposed by
Basu and Mitra (2007b). For any inﬁnite utility streams x ∈ X, deﬁne a set E(x) as
follows;
E(x) = {y ∈ X|∃T ∈ Z++,∀t ≥ T,xt = yt}.
That is, E(x) is the set of the same utility streams for all generations beyond some
generation T. The set E clearly forms an equivalence class, and the universal set X
is partitioned by E. We denote the set of partitions of X as E. Then, by the axiom of
choice, there exists a function which assigns each E ∈ E into x ∈ X such that g(E) ∈ E
for all E ∈ E. Using this function g, deﬁne a social welfare function as follows;
W(x) = lim
n→∞
n ∑
t=1
[U(xt) − U(gt(E(x)))],
where U(•) is a strictly increasing, real-valued, and strictly concave function. The
function W(x) must have a limit for all x ∈ X since both x and g(E((x))) are in
the E(x). Therefore, this social welfare function is well-deﬁned and satisﬁes WD by
deﬁnition. Because of the strict concavity of U(•), this function satisﬁes PDT. ∥
Since combining WD with PDT implies AE-1, the social welfare function above
readily satisﬁes AE-1.
The results of this section show that the non-negativeness of total surplus by income
transfer guarantee the existence of social welfare functions satisfying Weak Dominance.
That is, if society accepts only income transfers from a richer generation to a poorer
one, which keep total surplus of the aggregate welfare of the two generations to be non-
9negative, then we have a class of social welfare functions satisfying Weak Dominance.
The next section, however, proves that Weak Pareto Principle is inconsistent with
any axiom of distributive equity regardless of whether an aggregate welfare between
the rich and the poor after a transfer is negative or non-negative.
4 Impossibilities of the Weak Pareto Principle
This section investigates the logical relationships between three variations of distribu-
tive equity and Weak Pareto Principle. Impossibility results for Weak Pareto Principle
are more fundamental than impossibility results for Weak Dominance because Weak
Pareto Principle is considered as a basic concept of eﬃciency in that it requires social
welfare to increase if utilities of all generations could be strictly improved. In the
following discussion, we show that all concepts of distributive justice are inconsistent
with Weak Pareto Principle. It is, therefore, proved that there is substantial collision
between distributive equity and eﬃciency requirements in the social welfare function
approach for inﬁnite generations setting.
First, we begin by an impossibility result about social welfare functions satisfying
Weak Pareto Principle and Altruistic Equity-1 which is the weakest requirement among
our three equity axioms under Weak Dominance.
Proposition 4: Let Y ⊇ [0,1]. Then, there is no social welfare function satisfying
AE-1 and WP.
[Proof] Suppose to the contrary. Let a social welfare function W satisfy AE-1 and
WP. Deﬁne the two utility streams x(ϵ),yk(ϵ) as follows;
10For ϵ ∈ (3/10,1/2),
x(ϵ) = ((ϵ, 2ϵ)rep),
y
k(ϵ) =
((
ϵ + (2/3)
k−1(2/10), 2ϵ − (1/3)
k−1(1/10)
)
2k 1-rep , (ϵ, 2ϵ)rep
)
.
By deﬁnition, both x(ϵ) and yk(ϵ) are in (0,1)Z++ for all ϵ ∈ (3/10,1/2) and all natural
number k.
Now, we will show that AE-1 implies W(x(ϵ)) < W(y1(ϵ)) < W(y2(ϵ)) < .... It is
easy to check that y1(ϵ) is derived from x(ϵ) by an income transfer where generation
2 loses (1/10) but generation 1 gains (2/10). Hence, we have W(x(ϵ)) < W(y1(ϵ)).
Next, we show that for all k, the stream yk+1(ϵ) is constructed from yk(ϵ) by the
repeated applications of an appropriate income transfer.
In the stream yk(ϵ), odd-numbered generations are relatively poor but there are
inequalities among them, that is, one has ϵ + (2/3)k−1(2/10) but the other has only ϵ.
By implementing the transfer where the relatively rich odd-numbered generations loses
(2/3)k(1/10) but the relatively poor odd-numbered generations gains (2/3)k(2/10),
each generation has the same utility ϵ + (2/3)k(2/10). Speciﬁcally, for any i =
1,2,...,2k−1, we take (2/3)k(1/10) from (2i − 1)-th generation and give (2/3)k(2/10)
to (2k +2i−1)-th generation. Similarly, among even-numbered generations which are
relatively rich in yk(ϵ), there are also inequalities. Then, these generations can have
the same utility level 2ϵ−(1/3)k(1/10) through a transfer in which the rich who have 2ϵ
loses (1/3)k(1/10) but the poor who only have (2ϵ−(1/3)k−1(1/10)) gain (1/3)k(2/10).
That is, for any i = 1,...,2k−1, we take (1/3)k(1/10) from 2i-th generation and give
(1/3)k(2/10) to (2k + 2i)-th generation. Therefore, for all k, W(yk(ϵ)) < W(yk+1(ϵ)).
Then, for all distinct ϵ,ϵ′ ∈ (3/10,1/2) with ϵ > ϵ′, there exists a natural number K∗
11such that ϵ > ϵ′+(2/3)K−1(2/10) . Obviously, 2ϵ > 2ϵ′ and 2ϵ > 2ϵ′−(1/3)K−1(1/10),
so WP implies W(x(ϵ)) > W(yK(ϵ′)). Because W(yK(ϵ′)) > W(y1(ϵ′)) by the
above argument, for any ϵ,ϵ′ ∈ (3/10,1/2) with ϵ > ϵ′, the two closed intervals
[W(x(ϵ)),W(y1(ϵ))] and [W(x(ϵ′)),W(y1(ϵ′))] are non-degenerate, and the intersec-
tion between them is empty.
Thus, for any real number ϵ ∈ (3/10,1/2), we can choose a distinct rational number
r(ϵ) from the closed interval [W(x(ϵ)),W(y1(ϵ))]. This implies, however, the cardinal-
ity of continuum equals the countable cardinality: a contradiction. ∥
Since it holds true that AE-2 → PDT → AE-1 under Weak Dominance, Propo-
sition 4 is interpreted as a fundamental result for Weak Pareto Principle. In fact,
the remaining two equity axioms are incompatible with Weak Pareto Principle in the
social welfare function approach. The following two impossibility results can be es-
tablished by proofs which are similar to that of proposition 4. That is, whatever an
aggregate welfare resulted from an income transfer between the rich and the poor is,
the requirements of distributive equity and Weak Pareto Principle always leads to an
impossibility result.
Proposition 5: Let Y ⊇ [0,1]. Then, there is no social welfare function satisfying
PDT and WP.
[Proof] Since the proof of this proposition is similar to that of Prop.4, we omit some
details of the proof. Consider the two utility streams x(ϵ),yk(ϵ) as follows;
For ϵ ∈ (1/5,1/2),
x(ϵ) = ((ϵ, 2ϵ)rep),
12y
k(ϵ) =
((
ϵ + (1/2)
k−1(1/10), 2ϵ − (1/2)
k−1(1/10)
)
2k 1-rep , (ϵ, 2ϵ)rep
)
.
The stream y1(ϵ) is constructed from x(ϵ) by the income transfer 1/10 from gen-
eration 2 to generation 1. Hence, PDT implies W(x(ϵ)) < W(y1(ϵ)). Next for all k,
we show that the stream yk+1(ϵ) is induced from yk(ϵ) through the following transfer.
First, we transfer (1/2)k × (1/10) from the better-oﬀ odd-numbered generations
who have ϵ+(1/2)k−1(1/10) to the worse-oﬀ odd-numbered generations who have only
ϵ in the stream yk(ϵ). Then, each generation has the same utility ϵ + (1/2)k(1/10).
Similarly, even-numbered generations can have the same utility level 2ϵ−(1/2)k(1/10)
by the transfer (1/2)k(1/10) from the rich who have 2ϵ to the poor who have only
(2ϵ − (1/2)k−1(1/10)). Therefore, we show W(yk(ϵ)) < W(yk+1(ϵ)) for all k.
The remainder of this proof can be shown by the same argument used in the proof
of proposition 4. ∥
Proposition 6: Let Y ⊇ [0,1]. Then, there is no social welfare function satisfying
AE-2 and WP.
[Proof] Deﬁne two utility streams x(ϵ),yk(ϵ) as follows;
For ϵ ∈ (3/10,1/2),
x(ϵ) = ((ϵ, 2ϵ)rep),
y
k(ϵ) =
((
ϵ + (1/3)
k−1(1/10), 2ϵ − (2/3)
k−1(2/10)
)
2k 1-rep , (ϵ, 2ϵ)rep
)
.
The stream y1(ϵ) is gained from x(ϵ) by the transfer in which generation 2 loses
(2/10) but generation 1 gains (1/10). Next, we show that, for all k, the stream yk+1(ϵ)
is constructed from yk(ϵ) by repeated applications of an appropriate transfer. In the
stream yk(ϵ), if we implement the transfer in which the relatively rich odd-numbered
13generations loses (1/3)k(2/10) but the relatively poor odd-numbered generations gains
(1/3)k(1/10), then each odd-numbered generation has the same utility ϵ+(1/3)k(1/10).
In addition, even-numbered generations can have the same utility level 2ϵ−(2/3)k(2/10)
by means of a transfer in which the rich who have 2ϵ lose (2/3)k(2/10) but the poor who
only have (2ϵ − (2/3)k−1(2/10)) gain (2/3)k(1/10). Therefore, for all k, W(yk(ϵ)) <
W(yk+1(ϵ)).
The remainder of the proof can be shown by the same argument used in the proof
of proposition 4. ∥
Since SEP implies the axioms PDT, AE-1, and AE-2, the following corollary follows
directly from our impossibility results (propositions 4-6).
Corollary 2: Let Y ⊇ [0,1]. Then, there is no social welfare function satisfying
SEP and WP.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have examined the positive and negative relationships among the
distributive equity axioms and two weak forms of Pareto principle for problems in-
volving the aggregating inﬁnite utility streams. As a result, we show that there exists
no Paretian social welfare function satisfying any variation of the distributive justice
requirement in our framework. Table 1 summarizes the results obtained in this paper.
Table 1: Logical relationships between eﬃciency and distributive equity
14AE-1 PDT AE-2 SEP HEF
WD ⃝ ⃝ × × ×
WP × × × × ⃝
The symbols “⃝” and “×” indicate, respectively, “possibility” and “impossibility” results.
As we can see from table 1, we can construct social welfare functions satisfying
Weak Dominance and the two variations of distributive equity. These possibility re-
sults, however, should not be construed essentially as “positive” because an attempt to
aggregate inﬁnite utility streams never satisﬁes any form of equity axioms and Weak
Pareto Principle simultaneously –the latter axiom is a more basic eﬃciency requirement
than Weak Dominance. Accordingly, our analysis reveals the substantial diﬃculties of
the social welfare function approach in the context of intergenerational equity.
Now we comment on the further discussion.
First, the non-existence of a social welfare function does not necessarily mean
impossibility results of social ranking for inﬁnite utility streams. Indeed, Bossert,
Suzumura and Sprumont (2007) characterize orderings satisfying the axioms of Strong
Pareto Principle, Finite Anonymity and Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle. Therefore,
without a numerical representation of social evaluation for intergenerational equity, we
can construct social orderings which satisfy both equity and eﬃciency properties.
Secondly, we can attain some possibility results by weakening the domain restriction
of Y . Indeed, if Y = Z+, then we can easily construct a social welfare function
satisfying Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle and Pareto Principle following Basu and
Mitra (2007b).
15Lastly, the requirement of a numerical representation for social welfare functions is
logically independent of the continuity condition of social rankings. If a social ranking
on X is continuous with some topology, then the numerical representation of this
ranking must be continuous on X as well. But it does not imply the continuity of the
social ranking on X in which the numerical representation of the ranking is possible in
general. In their seminal paper, Sakai (2006) and Hara, et al. (2007) show that there
is no continuous social ranking on X satisfying both Pigou-Dalton Transfer Principle
and some axioms of collective consistency such as acyclicity. But their impossibility
results are all independent of our results because the numerical representability of social
rankings does not imply the continuity of these rankings. The results established in
this paper suggest a trade-oﬀ between intergenerational equity and eﬃciency in the
objective function in usual dynamic optimization problems.
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